公司法基础:英文本

公司法基础:英文本
作 者: 美罗伯塔·罗曼诺
出版社: 法律出版社
丛编项: 法律基础影印系列
版权说明: 本书为公共版权或经版权方授权,请支持正版图书
标 签: 商法
ISBN 出版时间 包装 开本 页数 字数
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作者简介

  罗伯塔·罗曼诺于1975年获得芝加哥大学经济学硕士学位,1980年获耶鲁大学法律博士学位,1985年起任耶鲁大学教授,研究领域是公司法、公司金融和金融市场监管。罗曼诺自1998年起承担《法律经济学评论》的编辑工作,并于1998-1999年间担任美国法律经济学协会主席。

内容简介

这十年经历了一场公司法革命。在这不同寻常的十年期间,业界创新了商业组织结构和兼并行为模式,而公司法领域的理论也由于引进了经济学的组织理论和现代公司金融理论等分析方法而大为改观。这种对经济学理论的融合深刻影响了公司运作方式以及公司法教学,而这种影响将持续下去。这本论文集着重介绍了公司法领域迥然对立的各种理论,以及这些理论得以产生的经济学基本原理。此外,我们通过提供公司治理方面广泛而繁茂的实证研究成果,努力用写实的手法给学子们描绘出对他们而言很陌生的公司法研究概况。因阿道夫·伯利和加德纳·米恩斯二人对所有权和经营权分离带来的问题之深刻分析,公众持股公司的重要特点变得明晰:公司经营业务的经理层并不拥有该公司。伯利和米恩斯认为这种分离产生了许多组织上的弊端,因为公司所有人的利益并不总是与经理层一致。这类问题被称为代理问题。正如这本论文集所阐释的,公司法的大部分内容就是在探讨如何处理代理问题。本书收集的论文运用经济学组织理论和公司金融理论从不同角度对这一问题展开剖析,并分别提出了不同的解决方案。我本人曾在公司法和公司金融等课堂上使用本书中的材料。编辑本书时我们有意将其做成供学生在公司法课堂讨论的教材,同时,体例上我们在每一章节安排了要点与问题,以便读者能独立阅读并自我指导。论文均经过多方面编辑加工,使其更好用。我们将初稿里的数学计算和公式进行了压缩,但要点里的数据原封不动,以阐释某些概念。当然这种做法很危险,因为失却了学术著述的复杂性,而且留给人一种错误的印象,即创建一个理论不会引起理解上的歧义。为尽量避免这种误识,我有意将观点大相径庭的相关论文及随后的要点并列编排在一起。此外,论文节录中的参考书目和脚注均已省去——为增强可读性和更适合教学,只好牺牲各论文节录的精确性和查阅引文出处的便捷性了。读者若对节录感兴趣,可以查找原论文。<

图书目录

ⅠTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets,1

A.TheoryoftheFirm,4

TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,Agency

Costs,and

 OwnershipStructure,4

 MichaelC.JensenandWilliamH.Meckling

TransactionCostEconomics,9

 OliverE.Williamson

OwnershipoftheFirm,15

 HenryHansmann

NotesandQuestions,22

B.TheoryofCapitalMarkets,26

FromARandomWalkDownWallStreet,26

 BurtonG.Malkiel

 FromCorporateFinance,43

 StephenA.Ross,RandolphW.Westerfield,and

JeffreyF.Jaffe

 NotesandQuestions,57

ⅡLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:Limited

Liability,61

 LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,62

 FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel

 LimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirm,70

 SusanE.Woodward

 TowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityfor

Corporate

 Torts,73

 HenryHansmannandReinierKraakman

 NotesandQuestions,78

ⅢTheProductionofCorporationLaws,82

A.StateCompetitionforCorporateCharters,84

 TheStateCompetitionDebateinCorporateLaw,84

 RobertaRomano

 TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelaware

Corporate

 Law,90

 JonathanR.MaceyandGeoffreyP.Miller

 NotesandQuestions,93

B.TheStructureofCorporationLaws,96

 TheCorporateContract,96

 FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel

 TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLaw,104

 JeffreyN.Gordon

TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:An

Essay

 ontheJudicialRole,111

 JohnC.Coffee,Jr.

 NotesandQuestions,113

ⅣFinancingtheCorporation,119

 OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBond

Covenants,121

 CliffordW.Smith,Jr.,andJeroldB.Warner

 ContractualResolutionofBondholder-Stockholder

Conflicts

 inLeveragedBuyouts,128

 KennethLehnandAnnettePoulsen

 ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof

Bankruptcy,130

 MichaelC.Jensen

 TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapital

 Organizations,132

 WilliamA.Sahlman

 TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,138

 FrankH.Easterbrook

 NotesandQuestions,140

ⅤInternalGovernanceStructures,146

A.BoardsofDirectorsandFiduciaryDuties,148

 CorporateGovernance,148

 OliverE.Williamson

 IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensation

Plans,155

 CliffordW.Smith,Jr.andRossL.Watts

 TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithout

Foundation?,162

 RobertaRomano

 Does"Unlawful"Mean"Criminal"?:Reflectionson

the

 DisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmerican

Law,173

 JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,

 NotesandQuestions,179

B.ShareholderVotingRightsandtheExerciseof

Voice,187

 VotinginCorporateLaw,187

 FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel

 TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandthe

Problemof

 ShareholderChoice,192

 JeffreyN.Gordon

 ProxyContestsandtheEfficiencyofShareholder

Oversight,197

 JohnPound

 APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,

206

 MarkJ.Roe

AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseof

Institutional

 InvestorVoice,210

BernardS.Black

ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationof

Bankruptcy,

 213

MichaelC.Jensen

NotesandQuestions,214

ⅥExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketfor

Corporate

Control,221

A.TheoriesandEvidence,223

MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,223

 HenryG.Manne

Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,225

 MichaelC.Jensen

BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,228

 AndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers

 RiskReductionasaManagerialMotivefor

Conglomerate

 Mergers,232

 YakovAmihudandBaruchLev

 TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,233

 RichardRoll

 TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientific

Evidence,235

 MichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback

 TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical

Evidence

 Since1980,242

 GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry

M.Netter

 HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturnto

Corporate

 Specialization,245

 SanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleifer,andRobertW.

Vishny

 NotesandQuestions,248

B.Management’sFiduciaryDutyandTakeover

 Defenses,258

 TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementin

Respondingtoa

TenderOffer,258

 FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel

 SeekingCompetitiveBidsVersusPurePassivityin

Tender

OfferDefense,262

 RonaldJ.Gilson

 TheCaseforFacilitatingCompetingTenderOffers:

AReply

andExtension,265

 LucianA.Bebchuk

 TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpirical

Evidence

Since1980,267

 GreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.Brickley,andJeffry

M.Netter

 TheWealthEffectsofSecond-GenerationState

Takeover

Legislation,272

 JonathanM.KarpoffandPaulH.Malatesta

 TheFutureofHostileTakeovers:Legislationand

Public

Opinion,278

 RobertaRomano

 NotesandQuestions,285

ⅦSecuritiesRegulation,293

 A.DisclosureRegulation,295

 MandatoryDisclosureandtheProtectionof

Investors,295

 FrankH.EasterbrookandDanielR.Fischel

 MarketFailureandtheEconomicCasefora

Mandatory

DisclosureSystem,301

 JohnC.Coffee,Jr.

 TheEffectofthe1933SecuritiesActonInvestor

Information

andthePerformanceofNewIssues,303

 CarolJ.Simon

 NotesandQuestions,305

 B.InsiderTradingRegulation,310

 InsiderTrading:Rule10b-5,Disclosure,and

Corporate

Privacy,310

 KennethE.Scott

 TheRegulationofInsiderTrading,313

DennisW.CarltonandDanielR.Fischel

 NotesandQuestions,317